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Abstract
We offer a new interpretation of the sovereign and commercial debt repatriation to
Germany that occurred between 1931 and 1938, involving German bonds held abroad.
These bonds exhibited a non-negligible and varying spread between their domestic
prices and their respective prices abroad. We analyze nine years of weekly prices
of these securities on domestic and foreign stock markets to argue that the crucial
factor for the origination, variation and persistence of the spread was the impact of
capital controls on the possibility of trading on secondary markets. We also find that
German authorities kept the practice of debt repatriation under increasingly strict
control in order to enjoy some of its political benefits, while avoiding detrimental
macroeconomic effects. Our conclusions differ from previous literature and in addition
provide a comprehensive interpretation of different aspects of the episode, consistently
with recent macroeconomic literature that links the efficiency of secondary markets to
sovereign risk.
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1 Introduction
[ . . . ] the Schachtian policy of buying back un-serviced loans below par con-
tributed to crushing Germany’s moral standing with the creditors.1
Hermann Josef Abs, 1953. Abs was Head of the German Delegation at the 1952
London Conference on German External Debts.
He [Hermann Josef Abs] bought back some of the external German debt (Kreuger
loan) and made a large arbitrage profit (the difference between the very low price
of German debt abroad, and its face value price within Germany) on the deal on
his own account.2
The role of secondary markets for sovereign debt has been until recently neglected in
macroeconomic theory. In practice, however, secondary markets have played an important
role during many sovereign debt crises. Depending on the causes of the crisis and the
legal framework, they can either bring about macroeconomic destabilization or function as
a mechanism of potential sovereign risk reduction. An example of the former is the South
American debt crisis of the 1980s, where secondary markets led to the emergence of a class of
small creditors prone to litigation that endangered the results of “the collective negotiation
and debt restructuring so crucial to resolving the [...] debt crisis” (Power, 1996). The latter
case arises when well-functioning secondary markets allow for debt ownership shifts during
a crisis: for instance, during the current European debt crisis a considerable portion of
sovereign debt was repatriated by domestic agents in crisis countries3 (Brutti and Saure´,
2013), presumably contributing to lowering yield spreads vis-a-vis the German Bund.
A repatriation of the kind described above can be explained through the mechanism of
the so-called Secondary Market Hypothesis put forward by Broner, Martin, and Ventura
(2008, 2010), which claims that well-functioning secondary markets serve as an enforcement
mechanism also when default penalties are low. Under the assumption that domestically
held debt enjoys considerably higher repayment probability, foreign debt holders under the
threat of default can and will sell their claims (public or private) to domestic agents, who
do not expect to be defaulted on. The ensuing repatriation of debt by domestic agents
will consequently reduce the debtor country’s potential net welfare gain from defaulting.
Therefore, the existence of complete secondary markets allows foreign asset trade in the first
place, and debt repatriation should be expected following a sovereign debt crisis. Conversely,
for a given level of default penalties, limiting the working of secondary markets increases
sovereign risk.
We revisit the German debt crisis of the 1930s and argue that this mechanism was in
action, meaning that the working of secondary markets influenced foreign debt default as
1Klug (1993) page 54, from Schwarz (1982) page 60.
2James (2004) page 59. During the 1930s, when these transactions took place, Abs was a director at Deutsche
Bank.
3Beyond what would be expected based on optimal portfolio allocation considerations.
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well as the actions of debtors and creditors. In 1930, foreign holders of German debt saw
their chances of repayment damaged by the Young plan, which re-established the seniority
of war reparations over commercial debts. Together with the effects of the Great Depression,
this caused a sudden stop of capital inflows that endangered the sustainability of German
debt (Ritschl, 2012), 46% which in 1931 consisted of short-term debt issued mostly in foreign
currency. As a result, sovereign risk increased and foreign debt holders started to sell their
claims on Germany finding willing buyers amongst German investors. However, in the sum-
mer of 1931 authorities introduced measures to curb capital flights, which also took the form
of restrictions of the availability of foreign currency to individuals and firms; ever stricter
capital controls were legislated over the years that followed (Ellis, 1940).
The introduction of capital controls meant that it was more difficult for a German citizen
to buy German debt traded on foreign markets. The eagerness of foreigners to sell and the
difficulties of Germans in buying introduced a wedge between the price at which German
debt was traded in foreign exchanges and its price in Berlin. The latter remained high as
shown in Figure 1 in reference to a particular class of bonds. German firms and citizens that
could access foreign currency continued repatriating German debt to exploit the arbitrage
opportunity. Repatriations continued to take place in non-negligible amounts until 1938. At
their peak in 1933 they amounted to 2% of German GDP, only to dwindle therafter due to
the specific measures introduced by the authorities aimed at managing repatriations.
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Figure 1: The index price of German 6% bonds in Berlin and New York.
Source: Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung (1933, 1936). In 1931, the Berlin stock exchange was only open
between the 1st of January and the 12th of July and from the 3rd to the 18th of August. The trading started
again in April 1932. In March 1935, the interest rate of the 6% bonds traded in Berlin was reduced to 4.5%.
This paper offers a comprehensive interpretation of key features of the repatriation
episode, which is coherent with German economic policy and its objectives in the 1930s.
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We identify three main questions to address: i) why did the repatriations start in earnest
in 1931, ii) what are the reasons for the origination, variation and persistence of a price
differential between German bonds traded at home and abroad, and iii) why and how did
the authorities intervene in the episode.
Previous analyses have often underplayed the fact that repatriations started as a private
initiative, instead focusing on explaining the actions of authorities and the impact of capital
controls on this practice. On this point many have argued, to a different extent, that
authorities encouraged debt repatriation and used the practice as an export subsidy tool,
since the foreign currency necessary for the purchases was allotted as a function of export
performance (see for example Heuser (1934); Einzig (1934); Harris (1935); Balogh (1938);
Bonnel (1940); Ellis (1941); Child (1958)). In a detailed economic analysis of the episode,
Klug (1993) partly departs from this interpretation and explains the repatriations as a mixed
policy of debt reduction4 and export promotion, the former point also briefly discussed by
James (1985).
The analysis of Klug (1993) raises the question whether Germany was, in fact, in a
situation of debt overhang. Following the argument of Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1991),
under debt overhang the marginal value of debt is nil, hence debt repatriation leads to a
net transfer of resources to the creditor without affecting the market value of debt, thus
invalidating Klug’s analysis. We do not touch on whether Germany was a actually in a
situation of debt overhang, a point already tackled in the literature (Ritschl, 2002). The
reason is that we argue, in short, on the validity of the application to this case of the
Secondary Market Hypothesis, implying that debt repatriation is rational for individuals of
the debtor country, although not collectively rational under debt overhang.
We argue that previous explanations based on export subsidization or debt overhang are
not compatible with the macroeconomic objectives of the Nazi regime and the late Weimar
governments and support this view with evidence from primary and secondary sources.
Instead, we claim that German authorities were aware that debt repatriation was not an
effective tool for debt overhang reduction and far from encouraging this activity, they kept
it under strict control. Detrimental macroeconomic effects were not the only concern of the
authorities, as individuals and firms close to the regime were granted the benefits of this
profitable debt repatriation practice.
We also provide quantitative evidence related to the dynamics of the spread between
prices of German debt traded abroad and in Berlin by examining weekly data of Dawes and
Young bonds prices traded in New York between 1930 and 1940. We choose these bonds
due to the particular status they enjoyed, as they were still serviced after the 1932 Lausanne
Conference (Piet, 2004). We detect structural breaks of the price series for both bonds
and provide confidence intervals around the breaks, to which we associate key political and
economic events.
Prices of financial instruments incorporate relevant information, and unforeseen events
can cause abrupt changes in the level or dynamics of prices. The structural breaks narrative
4This was a popular argument after the South American debt crisis of the 1980s; for a view of the debate,
see for example Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1991), Krugman (1988), Froot (1989) and Kenen (1991).
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strategy has not been uncommon since Guinnane, Rosen, and Willard (1995) analyzed how
the unfolding of military events during the American civil war was reflected in Greenback
prices; in relation to WWII, among others, Frey and Kucher (2000, 2001) study the impact of
the war on the prices of sovereign bonds of different countries traded in Switzerland, Brown
and Burdekin (2002) focus on German bonds traded in London, and Oosterlinck (2003) finds
that structural breaks in prices of sovereign French bonds in Vichy France were linked to
major political news, reflecting varying perceptions of default risk.
In our analysis we find that, together with the beginning of WWII, only events that put
sand in the wheels of secondary markets negatively affected the prices of German bonds in
New York. Interestingly, other episodes such as unilateral modifications to specific clauses
of bond contracts and various reductions in debt service cannot be associated to any of the
identified breaks. This suggests that well-functioning secondary markets were regarded as an
element of foremost importance by foreign creditors, a finding in line with the implications
of the Secondary Market Hypothesis (Broner, Martin, and Ventura, 2008, 2010).
We start our discussion in Section 2 by describing Germany’s debt situation in the 1930s,
its origins, and the introduction of capital controls. Sections 3 through 6 provide our pro-
posed interpretation. For ease of exposition, each of these sections covers one main feature
of the episode, namely how did the repatriation start, the reason for the price spread be-
tween Berlin and New York for the bonds under consideration, and what was the reaction
of authorities to the repatriations. In Section 7 we summarize previous interpretations of
the repatriation episode and comment on their strengths and shortcomings in explaining
coherently all main aspects of the repatriation episode. Section 8 summarizes our findings
and concludes.
2 Historical Context
2.1 The debt stockpile: reparations and borrowing in the 1920s
In the aftermath of World War I, the winning powers imposed a heavy reparation payments
burden on defeated Germany. The exact amount was not established by the Treaty of
Versailles but only in the protocol prepared by the Inter-Allied Reparations Commission (the
London Schedule of Payments) in 1921, which formally established Germany’s obligations
for the first time. Schuker (1988) recounts how reparation payments were divided into three
tranches, dubbed A, B and C, but uncertainty remained as to how much Germany would
eventually actually pay. While it was fairly clear that the A and B tranches - amounting to
50 million gold Marks - would constitute part of the final reparation burden, the C tranche
- amounting to around 82 million gold Marks - was never effectively billed to Germany, but
still hovered around in international negotiations for most of the interwar period.
Germany’s external debt was further increased by the heavy borrowing of all sectors of the
economy on international capital markets throughout the 1920s. Ritschl (2012) argues that
the Dawes Plan signed in 1924 was one of the triggers for Germany’s heavy borrowing during
the course of the decade. The Dawes Plan was intended to provide relief to a country that
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was slowly coming out of an economic and political crisis epitomized by the hyperinflation.
This international agreement featured the issue of bonds with maturity in 1949, the proceeds
of which went to Germany in order to help it keep monetary stability and meet reparation
payments (Piet, 2004). More importantly, the Dawes Plan made reparation payments de
facto junior with respect to commercial debts. According to Ritschl, this created a moral
hazard issue, which incentivized international markets to lend to German companies and
public bodies, confident that their claims would be senior to reparations. At the same time,
the moral hazard applied to the German counterparts, who found it very convenient to
borrow abroad.
Ritschl further argues that this regime was eventually reversed by the Young Plan, drafted
and adopted between 1929 and 1930, which re-established the seniority of reparations with
respect to commercial debts. This regime switch contributed to plunging Germany in eco-
nomic chaos by causing a sudden stop as commercial creditors saw their claims endangered.
By that time, foreign commercial debts had reached the astronomical level of 32.6 billion
Reichsmarks (Table 1). With the inclusion of reparations, Germany’s foreign debt amounted
to 67.6 billion Reichsmarks, or 81.5% of GDP. Mainly due to a sharp fall in GDP, the foreign
debt-to-GDP ratio reached its peak at the end of 1931 exceeding 100% Ritschl (2013).5
Table 1 also reports estimates reconstructed by Klug (1993) of the debt repatriation
carried out by Germans between 1932 and 1938. Klug believed that the debt repatriation
had started in earnest in 1932, but the archival sources we use to estimate the 1931 figure
highlight that the practice was already widespread during the previous year.6
Data collected from archival sources also gives us a snapshot of the nature and com-
position of German foreign commercial debts at the end of November 1931. The USA was
Germany’s principal creditor, with holdings of over 40% of the total foreign commercial debt.7
England, The Netherlands, Switzerland, France and the Bank for International Settlements
also had significant holdings (Table 2).
Germany’s industry was the principal debtor in the country, accounting for almost 62%
of total foreign debts. The public sector and banks accounted for around 16% and 15%
respectively. A large share - around 46% - of German foreign commercial debt was short
term (with a maturity of less than a year) with the rest divided between medium term -
around 4% - and long term - around 50%. The geographical distribution of this short-term
debt was quite different from the long term one, with the USA playing a less important role
5The figure in Table 4 refers to mid-1931, rather than the end of the same year. By that time, the German
foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio had not yet reached the 100% mark
6Germany Country File, Bank of England Archive; OV34/148: Special advisory Committee Basel 1931 and
OV34/179. As the author himself notes, however, some quantitatively negligible debt repatriations also
took place in the 1920s.
7Although America’s lending to Germany has been often highlighted as exceptional and at least partially
politically motivated - Schuker called it “American reparations to Germany” - the USA was probably the
principal lender of the 1920s for a good number of countries. Accominotti and Eichengreen (2013) have
recently shown that around 66% of all European bond issues between 1924 and 1928 took place in New
York. This dominant position was then reversed after the 1929 crash with Paris taking over as the principal
financial center for new bond issues.
5
Year GDP Commercial Reparations Total Repatriations Debt/GDP
1928 89.05 27 40 67 - 75.2%
1929 89.25 31 46 77 - 86.3%
1930 82.93 32.6 35 67.6 - 81.5%
1931 69.15 33.6 34 67.6 0.3 97.8%
1932 56.44 25.9 25.9 0.86 45.9%
1933 57.72 23.2 23.2 1.18 40.2%
1934 64.38 18.1 18.1 0.58 28.1%
1935 71.75 N/A N/A 0.54 N/A
1936 79.65 16.4 16.4 0.3 20.6%
1937 89.11 14.8 14.8 0.15 16.6%
1938 99.19 13.9 13.9 0.19 14.0%
Table 1: German GDP, foreign debt and debt repatriations, billions of Reichsmarks
Source: the debt series is from Bundesbank (1976), the GDP series is from Ritschl (2013), the debt repa-
triation series is from Klug (1993) for 1932-38 and the debt repatriation figure for 1931 is a lower bound
estimate calculated from Germany Country File, Bank of England Archive; OV34/179: Germany Morato-
rium. Report of the committee appointed to examine and interpret the figures submitted by the Reichsbank,
May 30th 1933.
Creditor country Debt share
USA 41.72%
Netherlands 16.96%
Switzerland 12.96%
England 12.94%
France 4.79%
Bank for International Settlements 3.49%
Italy 0.69%
(a) by creditor country
Debtor sector Debt share
Industry 61.68%
Public bodies 16.38%
Banks 15.35%
Reichsbank and Goldiskontbank 3.67%
Private citizens 2.41%
Insurance companies 0.40%
School, churches etc. 0.11%
(b) by debtor sector
Table 2: Total German foreign commercial debt, November 1931
Source: Bank of England Archive OV34/69 - Die Auslandsverschuldung Deutschlands nach dem Stande von
30. November 1931
and the debt more evenly distributed across the other principal creditors. The industrial
sector played a slightly smaller role in short-term borrowing while the Public Sector’s share
was higher than that of overall debt (Table 3).
German commercial foreign debt was issued in a variety of currencies, but the US Dollar
was the principal currency of denomination (Table 4). Around 50% of the debt was issued
in the US currency, 12% in British Pounds, 11% in Reichsmarks, 10% in Swiss Francs and
9% in Dutch Florins.
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Creditor country Debt share
USA 27.02%
Netherlands 17.26%
Switzerland 16.30%
England 14.04%
Bank for International Settlements 7.52%
France 5.41%
Italy 0.76%
Other countries 11.69%
(a) by creditor country
Debtor sector Debt share
Industry 53.00%
Public bodies 25.97%
Banks 8.34%
Reichsbank and Goldiskontbank 7.52%
Private citizens 4.58%
Insurance companies 0.47%
School, churches etc. 0.12%
(b) by debtor sector
Table 3: German foreign short-term commercial debt, November 1931
Source: Bank of England Archive OV34/69 - Die Auslandsverschuldung Deutschlands nach dem Stande von
30. November 1931.
Currency Debt share
US Dollar 50.0%
Pound Sterling 11.8%
Reichsmark 10.7%
Swiss Franc 9.7%
Dutch Florint 9.2%
French Franc 3.6%
Other currencies 4.9%
Table 4: German foreign commercial debt by currency of issue, November 1931
Source: Bank of England Archive OV34/69 - Die Auslandsverschuldung Deutschlands nach dem Stande von
30. November 1931.
2.2 The many guises of default: German foreign debt in the 1930s
Following the onset and deepening of the severe economic and financial crisis we normally
refer to as the Great Depression, the Reichsbank eventually ratified exchange controls in the
summer of 1931, in order to curb the massive capital flight the German economy was expe-
riencing (Bonnel, 1940; Child, 1958; James, 1985).8 The principal feature of this legislation
was that the German authorities restricted the availability of foreign exchange for individuals
and companies. Moreover, the authorities themselves had to approve the use of the foreign
exchange they granted. The allocation of foreign currency was at first established based on
8The matter was intricate from the start, and exchange controls regulations were changed countless times.
Following their informal adoption in July 1931, they led to “three general exchange-control laws, upwards of
50 separate decrees of amendment and adaptation, and something in the neighborhood of 500 administrative
rulings, to say nothing of clearing, compensation, and payment agreements with partner countries,” Ellis
(1940), page 9.
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the requirements of the previous year.9 This arrangement lasted until 1934 (James, 1985),
when even stricter controls on the use of foreign exchange were established (Klug, 1993).
At the international level, Germany’s economic, financial and political chaos was reflected
by a series measures aimed at giving temporary relief to German debtors. On the 21st of June
1931, US president Hoover introduced a one-year moratorium on German intergovernmental
debts and reparations. Moreover, the Reichsbank was given a $100 million emergency loan
from the Bank of International Settlements, the Bank of England, the Bank of France and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In addition, the first Standstill Agreement - signed
in August 1931 - meant that approximately 6.3 billion Reichsmarks of German short-term
debts were frozen.10 Finally, the Lausanne Conference of July 1932 virtually put an end to
reparation payments, while maintaining and protecting the service of the Dawes and Young
loans (Piet, 2004).
The march towards default accelerated after the rise to power of the NSDAP in January
1933, the reinstitution of Hjalmar Schacht as president of the Reichsbank in March of the
same year and his appointment as head of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Ministry of
Economics) in August 1934. Schacht was a prominent figure in German and international
economic and financial circles and was generally considered responsible for ending Germany’s
hyperinflation in the first half of the 1920s. He was also generally seen as a friendly figure by
the international community, at least until the start of his second stint as President of the
Reichsbank. At the same time, he was a strenuous and tireless opposer of the war reparations
imposed on Germany.
James (1985) recounts the steps taken by Schacht, shortly after his reinstitution. A new
Law on Payments Abroad was approved in May 1933, which forced all foreign debts not
covered by the Standstill Agreements - excluding interest and amortisation payments for
the Dawes loan and the interest payments for the Young loans - to be repaid through a
Konversionskasse (Conversion Bank) and which reduced the service of the debts to 75% of
the level of June 1933.11 By the end of the same year, the amount transferred was reduced to
30%. In January 1934, the Reichsbank declared that scrip would be exchanged with foreign
currency for 67% of the nominal value. This meant that 77% of the debt service could be
met.
The Germans introduced aggressive measures even with regard to the Dawes and Young
loans, which had previously commanded a privileged status. In May 1933, notwithstanding
the protests of the Bank for International Settlements who was the guarantor of these loans,
Germany unilaterally revoked the Gold Clause (Piet, 2004). This meant that the loans would
now be serviced in nominal rather than in the original gold value basis.
9In particular, in November 1931, it was established that 75% of previous year’s requirements of foreign
exchange would be allocated. In March 1932, the share was lowered to 35% and successively raised to 50%
(Klug, 1993).
10The agreement was renewed until 1939 with German debtors directly repaying part of the debts every
year.
11Debtors could pay up to 50% of the debts service, provided that this did not exceed 4% of the principal.
The remaining service was to be paid in scrip Reichsmarks (i.e. currency with no legal tender) with a
discount of 50%. The Reichsbank, in turn, promised to exchange the scrip with foreign currency.
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In the spring of 1934, Germany instituted a complete transfer moratorium - enforced
from July - which formalized its default on all foreign obligations (Ellis, 1941). Germany
was by no means the only country to follow this pattern of events: external defaults took
place in a large number of countries in Latin America and Europe in the early 1930s, but
its default was the largest of the interwar era (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013). Ellis (1940)
convincingly argues that the striking aspect of the exchange control system that came to life
in Germany during the 1930s was that, while it had all the characteristics of an emergency
measure and was so perceived by most contemporaries, it ended up becoming the defining
feature of German foreign economic policy during the decade. Holders of German securities
abroad followed the unfolding of these events closely and with growing anxiety.12
3 Our interpretation
A satisfactory account of the German debt repatriations should explain its three key features:
1) why the repatriations started in earnest in 1931; 2) the reason for the appearance and
persistence of the price differential between German bonds traded at home and abroad; 3)
the behavior of the German authorities. We provide such an account and use a variety of
tools to illustrate and substantiate our interpretation.
First, we argue that the incentives for agents to engage in the debt repurchases are
best interpreted in the light of simple extensions of a recent theoretical model of sovereign
risk, which emphasizes the role of secondary markets. In a companion paper we present
these extensions, which are based on the seminal work of Broner, Martin, and Ventura
(2010) - BMV hereafter - while below we only provide the intuition. Second, we investigate
the centerpiece of the repatriation episode - the price differential between domestically and
foreign traded German securities - by quantitatively analyzing a new dataset of German
bond prices traded in New York and Berlin. Third, we provide some qualitative evidence for
the authorities’ tolerance, control and apparent promotion of the repatriations.
In short, we argue that the German governments of the 1930s managed to make the most
out of the debt repatriations, an initiative which started spontaneously and was not planned
or introduced by the authorities. On the contrary, in order to extract some benefits out of
it, the authorities kept it under strict control. The huge price differential between German
bonds at home and abroad was a more than sufficient driver for investors to engage in foreign
debt repatriations. If unrestricted, however, the practice might have eventually led to the
undesirable repayment of a large chunk - if not all - of the German external debt.
Hence, Germany could have lost not only the possibility of repudiating its debt in the
future or receiving more debt relief from its creditors, but also accessory “micro” benefits such
as export subsidization and windfall profits for specific industries, companies and government
supporters. Restricting foreign debt repatriations gave Germany no reason to repudiate its
debt, and, in fact, Hitler himself did not consider this the best option (Klug, 1993). As long
12Contemporary commentators such as Einzig (1934), for example, identified the Reichsbank’s measures as
a severe blow to creditors’ hope of ever seeing full repayment.
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as the whole debt was not bought back, some in Germany could profit from the situation
while the country could maintain some ties with international markets.
4 Why did the debt repatriation start in earnest in
1931?
The economic context described in section 2 explains why sovereign risk on German debt
increased. Summarizing, between 1929 and 1931 Germany spiraled into political and eco-
nomic chaos due to the interaction between the Great Depression and Germany’s peculiar
situation, particularly its massive foreign debt and the large share of short-term liabilities.
Additionally, Germany’s commercial creditors saw their assets endangered by the Young
Plan, which made their claims junior with respect to reparations (Ritschl, 2013). These
conditions spurred foreign investors to liquidate their holdings of German debt, not roll over
their loans and not extend any further short-term or long-term credit (Ellis, 1940). Foreign
investors found German ones ready to purchase these securities, but the introduction of ex-
change controls (the first, relatively mild ones, already in the summer of 1931) interfered
with the workings of secondary markets, leading to a price differential opening up between
the quotations of the same bonds in Berlin and financial centers abroad.
The wedge between prices of bonds held in Germany and abroad can be explained by
different evaluations of sovereign risk between domestic and foreign investors. For foreign
investors the unfolding of the events described above translated into an increase in sovereign
risk, while German investors perceived an internal default as politically unlikely(a point
that will be further discussed below). A different assessment of sovereign risk between
domestic and foreign investors is not uncommon during a crisis, a point in case being the
recent European debt crisis, when debt was repatriated by struggling countries (Brutti and
Saure´, 2013). The origin of a different evaluation of risk can be complemented by the
Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz (1986) argument that domestic debt holders are in a privileged
position to obtain repayment due to, among other things, the ease with which they can
interact with the local legal system. In the specific case at hand, the arbitrage profits from
repatriating the debt could be realized by domestic agents within a short time frame by
selling the securities on the Berlin stock market - at least until exchange controls became
more stringent (see Section 2.2) - further attenuating the effects of sovereign risk on domestic
agents.
Thus, the debt repatriations unsurprisingly started as an entirely private initiative in
193113 as domestic agents needed no further encouragement, given the economic incentives
outlined above. Even as the authorities started imposing controls on the practice, private
sector initiative remained present and dominant. In fact, before Schacht’s New Plan of 1934,
debt repatriations became as important as to spur the creation of a private market for the
trading of foreign currency eligible to be used for repatriations. This currency sold at large
and growing premiums over regular free currency because of the potential for windfall gains
13Some quantitatively negligible repatriations also took place in the 1920s (Klug, 1993).
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due to the price differential between German securities held domestically and abroad (Table
5).
1933 1934
Month Premium, % Month Premium, %
August 122 January 148.5
September 124.8 February 149.5
October 125 March 153
November 120.5 April 158.5
December 129.5 May 156.5
June 200
July 215
August 250
Table 5: The premium of foreign currency eligible for debt repatriations over regular foreign cur-
rency.
Source: U.S. Tariff Commission, Foreign Trade and Exchange Control in Germany. Report No. 150, 2d
Series. Washington 1942, via Child (1958) page 118-119
The existence of this market led to the practice becoming increasingly concentrated in
the hands of a few large banks, “which facilitated control by the authorities on which types
of securities could be repatriated” (Child (1958), page 118-19). The market ceased to exist
altogether with the provisions of August 1934, which made “free” foreign exchange non-
transferable.14
The role of secondary markets and the effects of more stringent exchange controls are
best understood through the Secondary Market Hypothesis and its formalization in the BMV
model. The model posits that when a sovereign crisis ensues and the debtor government
cannot credibly commit to enforce payments, creditors will be willing to sell their asset
holdings of debt on well-functioning secondary markets at any positive price since, if they
hold them, they will eventually have a value of zero. Citizens of the debtor country, instead,
will be willing to repurchase them at any price up to face value since any lower price translates
into a riskless arbitrage profit, given that the government is expected to enforce payments
between domestic citizens. This is the case because, if the debt is held internally in its
entirety, an internal default will only lead to an internal redistribution of income, not a
net gain resulting from foregone payments to foreigners. Thus, with the repatriations the
welfare incentive to default disappears. In the BMV framework, eventually all bonds will
be bought back at face value by the citizens of the debtor country since, if they trade even
at a fractional discount, there will be untapped arbitrage opportunities.15 In the absence,
14An additional feature of the controls was that before January 1934, bonds repatriated could only be sold
to the original issuer (Klug, 1993); while this might have led to some discount compared to stock market
prices, the arbitrage operation was still vastly profitable for those who could engage in it.
15This equilibrium is inefficient ex post for the debtor country. The efficient solution would be for the
citizens of the debtor country to collude and not repurchase the debt on secondary markets. However, each
individual can make large capital gains by buying the bonds. Ex ante, however, the presence of complete
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or severe malfunctioning, of secondary markets, instead, there will be no international trade
in assets in the first place. Without secondary markets, the debtor government will never
enforce payments and, knowing this, potential foreign creditors will never lend.
The BMV framework is relevant for the case at hand also when extended to reproduce
some important features of the historical period. The qualitative results of the model are
in fact robust to: i) relaxing the assumption that redistribution does not matter in case of
an internal default by introducing debtor heterogeneity, whereby the government places a
greater weight on the welfare of a group of citizens; in the context of the German case, both
the Weimar Republic and NSDAP Governments were supported by influential groups; ii)
introducing asymmetric information among creditors, where only a fraction of creditors are
fully informed about economic and political developments in the debtor country after the
lending stage.
To sum up, limiting debt repatriations has two principal effects. On one side, it limits
the scope for arbitrage by domestic agents, but also leads to a countrywide welfare gain due
to foregone payments abroad. On the other side, it damages foreign creditors who are unable
to obtain full repayment of their lending through the indirect channel of secondary market
sales. Although foreign bondholders in the interwar period publicly deprecated foreign debt
repatriations, their private stance was quite favorable, and interferences in the functioning
of secondary markets were seen with hostility.16 Eichengreen and Portes (1990b) report a
statement by the Council of Foreign Bondholders from 1937, which declared that restraints of
bond repurchases would be met with “strong and [...] effective criticism on the ground that,
by limiting the market in such bonds, it would act detrimentally to the bondholders”. The
Creditor Representatives were more open about the benefits of the repatriations declaring in
1934 that “German manufacturers and German debtors are benefited, as also are the foreign
creditors, the holders of German dollar bonds, the demand for which at improved prices has
been considerably increased as a result of these transactions.”17
secondary markets is beneficial to both countries since they allow the existence of asset trade. Moreover,
secondary markets ensure that assets are transferred from those who value them less (creditors) to those
who value them more (debtors) and asset holdings are aligned with the preferences of the government who
makes the enforcement decision. The main results are robust to the introduction of frictions (e.g. transaction
costs), many countries, time periods, shocks, sources of market incompleteness, and sources of heterogeneity
within and between regions (BMV, 2010). The model relies on some additional assumptions: there is no (or
limited) collusion among debtor country citizens; the government is indifferent to the redistribution following
a domestic default; and the government’s enforcement decision happens after the trade in secondary markets
is concluded. If it takes place before, the government will not enforce payments and asset trade will be
destroyed.
16Interestingly, the US government demonstrated its support for the continuation and extension of the
exchange controls at the London Conference of 1931. The measure was seen with favour by the Americans
presumably because it stopped the liquidation of short-term loans (at this point the Standstill Agreement
covered less than half of all short-term debts and the exchange controls were still rather porous), which
might have endangered the repayment of long-term debts, which constituted the bulk of American credit
in Germany (The Economist, July 25, 1931, p. 160, via Ellis (1940).
17Opening Statement of the Creditor Representatives, Berlin May 4 1934, via Klug (1993), page 37.
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5 What explains the price differential between German
bonds traded at home and abroad?
Foreign holders of German debt saw their chances of repayment endangered by the Young
plan, negatively affecting prices. Lower prices abroad thus originated, ceteris paribus, an
arbitrage opportunity for German investors. What accounted for the persistence of the
spread between German bonds traded at home and abroad and its variation? Consistently
with the Secondary Market Hypothesis, we argue that restrictions on the possibility for
German citizens to trade on secondary markets had strongly adverse effects on the price of
German bonds traded in New York. The channel through which prices were affected is the
strong influence of the possibility of asset trade on secondary markets on foreign creditors’
perceived probability of repayment and the impossibility of German investors to fully exploit
the arbitrage opportunity represented by the spread. We can’t directly test this channel,
but we can test if major variations in the spread between domestic and foreign bonds can
be associated with events that altered the functioning of secondary markets. The aim is to
reasonably recover the information content of bond prices by associating important events
to structural breaks in prices, within a coherent economic narrative. This empirical strategy
is similar to Brown and Burdekin (2002), who analyze Dawes and Young bonds in London,
Oosterlinck (2003), Frey and Kucher (2000, 2001), among others.
More precisely, we look for structural breaks in the weekly price series of Dawes and
Young bonds traded on the New York Stock Exchange and in reconstructed series of the
spread between German bonds traded in Berlin and Dawes and Young bonds traded in New
York between 1930 and 1940. The Young and Dawes bond issues were the direct results
of the Dawes and Young Agreements described in section 2 and were essentially German
Government debt commanding a somewhat privileged status compared to other bond issues
(Piet, 2004). Working with asset price data has attractive features for our analysis: high
frequency and reliability. High frequency, in our case. translates into weekly data, while the
reliability is due to the fact that stock market data is less prone to direct manipulation.18
Figure 2 presents the weekly data for the Dawes and Young bonds traded on the New York
Stock Exchange between December 1929 (June 1930 for the Young series) and June 1940,
manually collected from the New York Times publication The Annalist, as well as quotations
of German Mortgage bonds on the Berlin Stock Exchange available from Global Financial
Data. Two data issues are immediately apparent: i) the series for Berlin is incomplete, as
the Stock Exchange was closed from July 1931 to April 1932; ii) in order to work at the
weekly frequency we use German Mortgage bonds as a proxy for our series of interests in
Berlin. In dealing with the first issue, we reconstruct the missing data in the bonds traded in
18There is substantial literature using different empirical strategies than ours but still relying on bond prices
to study historical and economic events, for example Oosterlinck and Landon-Lane (2006); Flandreau,
Gaillard, and Panizza (2010). The historical period we are studying does not influence our choice of
empirical strategy: Eichengreen and Portes (1990a) have shown that financial markets in the 1930s were
equally sophisticated and able to process information as in the 1980s and that sovereign bonds were widely
traded in secondary markets, a finding confirmed by Stone (1991).
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Figure 2: Young and Dawes bonds traded in New York and Mortgage bonds traded in Berlin,
weekly frequency. Source: The Annalist.
Berlin assuming four different scenarios, all but one involving an eight-week slump in prices
correlated to the dynamics of the US stock market. The scenarios differ in the timing of
the slump (ranging from July-August to October-November 1931), whereas one consists in
a linear interpolation for the missing subsample. We then use these reconstructed series to
get four different spreads series for the Dawes and Young bonds respectively (appendix A).
We justify the use of German Mortgage bonds as close substitutes for our series of interest
traded in Berlin based on considerations summarized in figure 3. The lower panel of figure 3
shows that the monthly price of Young bonds traded in Berlin was highly correlated with the
prices of other German bonds, private and public, traded on the same exchange. Moreover,
the prices of German bonds traded in Berlin reported in Figures 2 and 3 show that, indeed,
these followed a very different path from similar bonds traded abroad. First of all, their price
recovered much faster after the crash of 1931. Secondly, the apparent correlation between
German bonds traded in Germany and in New York breaks down in the first half of 1934,
with bonds in Berlin trading at stable price close to face value, whereas in New York prices
of German bonds were more volatile and trending downwards. The upper panel of figure 3
shows that public and private German bonds traded in New York were highly correlated.
This reassures us on focusing our study only on Dawes and Young bonds. In fact, while
the German government was very keen in claiming a difference between “political” and
other debts, the treatment of different categories of debtors was not significantly different in
practice (Guinnane, 2004). Moreover, the decision to repay foreign debts, whether public or
private, eventually rests with a country’s authorities. This was recognized also by the parties
involved in the London Debt Agreement of 1953, where both private and public German debts
from the interwar period were discussed and repayment was negotiated jointly. In any case,
the privileged status of Young and Dawes loans, which gave them a certain degree of seniority
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Figure 3: German bonds traded in New York and Berlin, monthly frequency. Source: Institut
fu¨r Konjunkturforschung (1933, 1936).
over other debts (Piet, 2004), means that these bonds were less prone to fluctuation due to
temporary shifts in economic conditions, policy and creditor expectations, which serves well
the purpose of our analysis.
The empirical analysis, in practice, will consist in the identification of the dates of struc-
tural breaks in the time series of the price level of Dawes and Young bonds. We then check
the results by performing the same analysis on the reconstructed spread between the price
of German mortgage bonds traded in Berlin and the Dawes and Young bonds traded in New
York. Ideally we would use the spread data as a the main object of investigation, but the
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reliability of this data hinges heavily on the different assumptions made to reconstruct it.
We treat both the dates and number of breaks as unknown a priori, to be endogenously
determined from the data.19 We follow the dynamic optimization procedure of Bai and Per-
ron (1998, 2003) and we also check for the robustness of the estimated break dates with the
sequential estimation technique based on Bai (1997a,b) and Chong (1995). The dynamic
optimization procedure estimates the break dates for a given number of breaks, after having
tested for the optimal number of breaks with different statistical tests described in Bai and
Perron (1998, 2003). We present results where the number of breaks is identified at the 99%
confidence level and provide asymmetric 90% confidence intervals around the break dates,
which allows to identify the events we connect with the break within a reasonable time in-
terval rather than a single date. We assume an autoregressive process of the first order for
the price level20. The constant term and the coefficients of the model are both subject to
structural breaks, implying that we allow for breaks both in the level and the persistence
of the process. We add a measure of the New York stock exchange market performance as
an exogenous regressor, whose parameter is not subject to structural breaks. The dynamic
optimization procedure finds the structural breaks dates (T1, ..., Tm) of the resulting partial
structural change model such that:
(Tˆ1, ..., Tˆm) = argminT1,...,Tm
m+1∑
j=1
Tj∑
t=Tj−1+1
[yt − αˆj[Tj ] − ρˆj[Tj ]yt−1 − βˆ[Tj ]zt] (1)
where yt is our series on interest, either the price level of the Dawes and Young bonds
traded in New York or one of the reconstructed series of the spread, zt is the exogenous
control for market performance and the hat denotes sample estimates. There are m + 1
regimes j = 1, ...,m+ 1 (with T0 = 0 and Tm+1 = T ), where m is the number of breaks and
the subscript [Tj] represents the dependence of the parameter estimates on the date of the
breaks.
The estimated break dates and their confidence intervals are depicted in figures 4 and 5
for Dawes and Young bonds respectively. What emerges from our empirical exercise is that,
indeed, restrictions on the possibility for German citizens to trade on secondary markets had
strongly adverse effects on the price of German bonds traded in New York. We interpret this
as an indication that the perceived probability of default for foreign creditors was strongly
19It is important to note that allowing for more than one break requires different, and more complex,
statistical procedures than in the well-known case of a single break. For an overview of the literature, refer
to Hansen (2001) and Perron (2005).
20 The choice of a first-order autoregressive model permits us to use a reasonably flexible, yet easily tractable
model. Bond prices are usually modeled in the literature as unit root processes, but other than this there
would be no other reason for choosing a unit root process to analyze this set of data. Unit root tests
typically found in the literature cannot be applied in this case, as we are considering possible multiple
breaks: the appropriate test would be one which tests the null of a unit root with multiple breaks against
the alternative of a stationary process with multiple breaks. To our knowledge, such a test exists only for
cases with two breaks (Lee and Strazicich, 2003) but not for an arbitrary number of breaks. We therefore
assume stationarity of the series under each regime and will use standard methods to identify potential
explosive behavior of the series after structural breaks have been accounted for.
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Figure 4: Dawes bond log-price with estimated break dates; shaded areas are 90% confidence
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Figure 5: Young bond log-price with estimated break dates; shaded areas are 90% confidence
intervals
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influenced by the possibility of asset trade on secondary markets. Our results are also peculiar
for what they do not find. The service of German foreign debt was modified a number of
times - for example, in May 1933 the the German government unilaterally revoked the Gold
Clause, which meant that the Dawes and Young bonds started being serviced in nominal
rather than in the original gold value basis - however, we do not find breaks in correspondence
to such events 21.
Break date 90% confidence interval Mean Event
05/9/1931 07/3/1931 - 19/9/1931 51.4 At the end of July 1931 exchange controls
were introduced amid political and economic
turmoil (Ellis, 1941). August 1931 also saw
the signing of the first Standstill Agreement,
which froze 6.3bn Reichsmark of German
short-term debt (Piet, 2004).
11/6/1932 23/4/1932 - 06/8/1932 67.3 The Lausanne conference was held from June
16 to July 9, 1932 and virtually put an end to
reparations payments, while maintaining the
service of the Dawes and Young bonds (Piet,
2004).
19/5/1934 05/5/1934 - 23/6/1934 28.1 The transfer crisis started in March 1934,
continued with a month-long conference in
May and subsequently culminated with the
enforcement of a complete transfer morato-
rium on foreign payments, which established
the complete control of the Reichsbank on all
foreign exchange operations.
04/9/1937 19/12/1936 - 25/9/1937 23.8 In May and September new capital controls
are introduced.
12/11/1938 05/11/1938 - 10/12/1938 19.3 Foreign exchange controls announced and im-
plemented in November and December.
26/8/1939 12/8/1939 - 09/9/1939 10.8 September 1st 1939: Germany invades Poland
Table 6: Break dates with 90% asymmetric confidence bands and corresponding events for the
Dawes bond price series. The reported mean is the expected long-run value of the estimated
stationary AR(1) process for the regime starting at the respective break date.
21We also do not find a break associated to the price slump of Spring 1933, caused by the policy uncertainty
surrounding the first “temporary” moratorium on foreign payments. The moratorium did not affect the
Dawes bonds but only the amortisation of the Young bonds ((Toniolo, 2005), pages 153-57). Prices recovered
from mid-1933 until January 1934, probably due to a group of countries (Netherlands, Switzerland and
briefly the UK) offering to raise their import quota of German goods in return for investor protection (Piet,
2004). This would have obviously had a positive impact on German foreign currency reserves and thus on
the servicing of its foreign debt.
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In Table 6 we associate the estimated break dates and their confidence intervals for the
Dawes bonds to key events we believe influenced the market. What sets the events we
find apart from other key historical events is that they correspond to instances of German
citizens and companies being restricted from accessing secondary markets abroad. The first
break and its confidence interval correspond to the introduction of exchange controls in
1931, which was accompanied by a 50% decrease in the expected value of the estimated
stationary process of the regime (see the Mean column in the table). Exchange controls
made the repurchase of securities abroad very difficult for German investors and companies
given that, following the introduction of this measure, foreign exchange availability and its
use were tightly controlled by the Reichsbank. Conversely, the second break we identify is
connected with an increase in the price of German bonds. This is not surprising since we
associate the break to the Lausanne Conference of July 1932, which essentially put an end
to reparation payments, thus raising the expected value of the remaining serviced claims,
including Dawes and Young bonds. The introduction of a complete transfer moratorium,
as well as even tougher exchange controls in 1934, is connected to a further collapse in the
price of Dawes bonds. This legislation made debt repurchases extremely difficult due to the
complete monopoly of the Reichsbank over foreign exchange operations. This legislation was
announced after the so-called Transfer Conference of April-May and enforced as from July
1934. As shown already in Table 1, foreign debt repatriations grew in volumes over time,
peaking at over a billion Reichsmarks in 1933, only to dwindle after the policy tightening
of 1934, notwithstanding the subsequent enormous increase in the spread and the equally
large risk-less arbitrage profits which could be made from this state of things. We are also
able to pick up the further tightening of exchange controls in May and September 193722,
as well as the announcement and implementation of the foreign exchange law in November
and December 193823. The last break we pick up is not an episode of financial repression
but the outbreak of World War II, represented by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the
German invasion of Poland on September 1st, 1939. The implications of this major event
on expectations of repayment are clear and are reflected by a 50% hit to the prices of Dawes
bonds in that week.
Table 7 presents the results for the Young bonds. The breaks identified are the same
except for the first. In this case, the model picks up an extended period of turbulence
between the introduction of the exchange controls in 1931 and the Lausanne Conference of
1932 resulting in a single break instead of two separate ones. The main message remains,
however, unchanged.
To sum up, the breaks we find correspond to complex and multifaceted episodes accom-
panied by partial or total defaults or restructurings. We argue that the financial repression
that accompanied them was the key element of these episodes for creditors’ expectations of
22More precisely: on May 27th, see Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1937, Teil I, Nr. 65, p. 600-601;
and on September 16th, see Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1937, Teil I, Nr. 105, p. 1018-19.
23November 8th: Antra¨ge auf Zuteilung von Devisen. December 12th: Bekanntmachung des Gesetzes u¨ber
die Devisenbewirtschaftung. Source: Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt Jahrgang 1938, Teil I, Nr. 211, p. 1733-
48. Exchange banks were also involved in the confiscation of Jewish securities.
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Break date 90% confidence interval Event
26/12/1931 19/9/1931 - 21/5/1932 Dates in between the introduction of capital
controls by the end of July 1931 and the Lau-
sanne conference starting in June 1932.
03/3/1934 27/1/1934 - 05/5/1934 The transfer crisis started in March 1934,
continued with a month-long conference in
May and subsequently culminated with the
enforcement of a complete transfer morato-
rium on foreign payments, which established
the complete control of the Reichsbank on all
foreign exchange operations.
04/9/1937 02/1/1937 - 09/10/1937 In May and September new capital controls
are introduced.
26/11/1938 29/10/1938 - 17/12/1938 Foreign exchange controls announced and im-
plemented in November and December.
26/8/1939 12/8/1939 - 16/9/1939 September 1st 1939: Germany invades Poland
Table 7: Break dates with 90% asymmetric confidence bands and corresponding events for the
Young bond price series. Means of the estimated AR(1) process are not reported as many of the
parameters are not found to be significant, but this has no impact on the estimated break dates.
repayment. The exchange controls which limited the access of Germans to secondary mar-
kets closed the channel through which the effects of limited debt services to foreigners could
be offset. In fact, in the face of a purely external default such as the one we observe, debt
repatriation would have represented a natural way for creditors to dismiss unwanted assets
and for German citizens to profit on their higher probability of repayment.
For reasons already put forward, we have not relied so far on the analysis of the spreads.
When repeating the analysis on the different reconstructed spread series, however, we find
most reported breaks and their associated confidence intervals to be present in almost all
models and no very different break dates are detected, both for the Dawes and Young bonds.
The comparison of our results with the break dates obtained by Brown and Burdekin
(2002)24 is illustrative of the usefulness of our empirical approach compared to theirs, which
is commonly found in the literature (for instance, the previously cited Oosterlinck (2003)
and Frey and Kucher (2000, 2001)). One break we share in common is the outbreak of
WWII. They also find two breaks in 1935 and two in 1937; however, they are associated
with events of political nature, such as the reintroduction of conscription, and not with
financial repression events. The importance of providing confidence intervals, not possible
with the common approach, is evident when noticing that the two breaks they find in 1937
could in fact correspond, according to our identification, to a single break situated in period
24The samples differ, overlapping only for the period 1933-1940, which is the period we compare.
20
of turbulence due to the introduction of multiple layers of capital controls.
6 How is the behavior of the German authorities ex-
plained?
The behavior of the German government represents, perhaps, the most puzzling part of
the story. If, as we argue, the German government showed awareness that foreign debt
repatriations can be detrimental for a highly indebted country, then macro objectives such
as systematic export subsidization and large-scale debt reduction were not the ultimate
policy goals of this practice. Then why did the German government not completely suppress
foreign debt repatriations? Why were some resources put aside for debt repurchases?
We argue that limited and tightly controlled debt repatriations were a useful policy
tool. By limiting the availability of foreign exchange and controlling its use, the German
authorities were able to extract some microeconomic benefits from the repatriations, without
any major detrimental macroeconomic consequence.
First, genuinely additional exports - which would not have taken place without the possi-
bility of debt repatriations (see section 7.1 for an illustration of the role of debt repatriations
in trade policy) - were a source of foreign exchange, rather than a leakage. Foreign exchange
was of essential importance to Germany to service the debt and to acquire raw materials
and capital goods abroad. Second, there is ample evidence that key industries benefited
significantly on export markets thanks to these hidden subsidies (James, 1985). Third, the
debt repatriations served as a private debt reduction tool and source of risk-less arbitrage
profits for specific - and influential - industries, individuals and companies. It is well known
that there were strong connections between the Nazi party and groups of industrialists -
Ferguson and Voth (2008) have recently documented them and their economic implications
- and previous governments had strong connections with interest groups such as the land-
owning Junkers. It is not difficult to imagine that granting the possibility of repurchasing
foreign debt abroad was a way of favoring supporters and strengthening alliances.
For example, the companyMiag Mu¨hlenbau und Industriegesellschaft was granted foreign
currency in order to buy-back some of its own debt securities from abroad, which bore a
particularly heavy interest burden (Klug, 1993). Influential individuals could also engage in
sizable repatriations. Hermann Josef Abs - an important figure in post-WWII Germany and
in the 1953 London debt agreement in particular, and a Deutsche Bank director in the 1930s
- made large personal profits by purchasing German debt abroad and selling it for higher
prices in Germany (James, 2004). The finance minister Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
carried out a similar operation in November 1933, but was only granted around half of the
foreign exchange he had initially requested (Klug, 1993). Finally, the NSDAP itself, in a
period when it was particularly cash-strapped (precisely between Autumn 1933 and Spring
1934), employed some intermediaries to buy large quantities of German debt throughout
Europe in order to make profits by selling it at home.
A key feature of our interpretation is that the German government’s course of action of
21
defaulting on foreign creditors, while enforcing domestic payments, was in line with investors’
expectations, leading to the price differential we document. Our view could be contested
on the basis of the fact that, just a decade earlier, Germany underwent a massive default
on its domestic rather than foreign creditors in the form of hyperinflation. How - it could
be inquired - can the radical difference in policy response between the two episodes be
explained? Apart from the clear political differences between Germany in the early 1920s -
a newly established democracy emerging from a traumatic military defeat - and in the early
1930s - a country in deep economic crisis transitioning from an unpopular and dysfunctional
democracy to a nationalistic totalitarian regime - we can also identify an economic rationale.
Following Erce (2012), we can frame the selective default decision - that is the decision
to default on either internal or external creditors, or both - based on the following elements:
1) the source of the liquidity pressure 2) the health of banking system 3) the sources of
financing for the economy. First, as shown in Section 2, almost half of Germany’s foreign
commercial debt was short-term. Towards the end of the 1920s, rolling over this debt became
increasingly difficult, mainly due to the onset of the Great Depression and the deteriorating
financial circumstances in the United States and other creditor nations. By studying the
1930s defaults for a panel of over 20 countries (including Germany), Papadia (2015) has
shown that a large reliance on short-term financing was indeed a key driver of external
default, even after a wide range of political and economic characteristics are controlled for.
The evidence thus points to a strong liquidity pressure coming from abroad in 1930s Germany.
Second, Germany underwent a devastating banking crisis in 1931. This made it very
unpalatable for the authorities to impose further pressure on a crippled financial sector in
the form of an internal default. Sovereign defaults are known to have severe consequences for
the banking sector due to the generally large holdings of government debt of banks. Moreover,
exchange controls were introduced precisely in order to shield the domestic economy and the
banks from capital flight. The precarious health of Germany’s banking system might have
therefore further discouraged the German authorities from not enforcing domestic payments.
Third, while Germany relied heavily on foreign borrowing to finance reparations pay-
ments, as well as its public and private sectors during the 1920s, international financial
markets were essentially shut for German borrowers starting from 1929, particularly for
medium and long-term loans.25 Although the 1920s borrowing spree took off only with the
signing of the Dawes Plan in 1924, after the hyperinflation was over, the German authorities
could have foreseen the possibility of tapping up foreign credit markets already in the early
post-war years and might thus have eschewed external default based on reputational consid-
erations and presumably on a lack of political power. After the deluge in foreign borrowing of
1925-28, instead, the German economy started moving towards (partial) trade and financial
autarky, especially after the NSDAP ascended to power in 1933. In this context, access to
foreign borrowing became of limited importance, thus paving the way for external default.
25An important exception is the Young loan of 1930 (Ritschl, 2012) and the fact that, as Ritschl (2001) put
it, “during its first two years Nazi Germany was successful in attracting fresh credit despite the continuation
of the standstill agreement and the default of 1933/34 on long term credit. One reason may have been the
discrimination against (mostly American) long term debt in favor of continuing service on (mostly British)
short-term credits (this is Schuker’s hypothesis)”.
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Furthermore, due to the composition of Germany’s debt in the aftermath of WWI, inter-
nal default was, essentially, the only option. Most of Germany’s debts - with the exception
of the newly imposed war reparations - were domestic, as opposed to those of the UK and
France, who had borrowed heavily from the United States (Guinnane, 2004). Germany’s
debt burden in the post-WWI years was also constituted mainly of government debt arising
from the war, while in the 1930s the whole economy was deeply indebted. While an economy-
wide external default such as the German one can be disruptive, an economy-wide domestic
default would put in question the security of property rights with potentially devastating
consequences.
To conclude our discussion, we point out that there was a form of mild and implicit
internal default in 1930s Germany. The work-creation program of the National Socialist
government relied on financial repression, of which the exchange control system, with its
ability to stop outward capital flows, was an important part (Ellis, 1940). The financial
repression meant that short-term assets were transformed into long-term ones through ad-
hoc consolidation loans, interest rates and dividends were unilaterally reduced and kept
artificially low and the Golddiskontbank used the proceeds of promissory notes (Solawechsel)
sold to commercial banks to purchase treasury bills, which were then rediscounted by the
Reichsbank (Poole, 1939). These measures have much in common with other historical and
recent episodes of financial repression and, although they do not represent a default in the
classic sense, they are generally considered a de facto partial default on domestic holders of
government debt.
7 Explaining the debt repatriations: the existing liter-
ature and its limits
In this section, we discuss the two main explanations for the debt repurchases put forward
in the existing literature. Both focus on providing a rationale for the authorities’ tolerance,
control and apparent promotion of the repatriations. Neither explanation outlines the in-
centives of those engaging in the repatriations from either the buy or sell side, except for
acknowledging potential arbitrage profits due to the price differential of German bonds be-
tween domestic and foreign markets. Crucially, however, no attempt is made to explain the
origin of the price differential itself. We also argue that, at times, previous explanations lack
internal coherence.
7.1 The traditional explanation: foreign debt repatriations as ex-
port subsidies
Traditional views of the debt repatriations were influenced by an imperfect knowledge of the
true size of the phenomenon (Klug, 1993). Moreover, most authors were chiefly concerned
with explaining the introduction and perpetuation of the exchange controls system, rather
than the repatriations per se. Even with regards to the exchange controls, while most authors
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concurred that the rationale behind their introduction in 1931 was stopping capital flight,
explanations regarding their perpetuation differ.
Child (1958), for example, saw the exchange control system as a highly sophisticated
trade policy tool. The author argued that the German authorities used it to manipulate
the size, direction and terms of trade in Germany’s favor by exploiting the county’s monop-
olistic/monopsonistic position in certain markets, especially in South-Eastern Europe and
Latin America. Ritschl (2001), however, has ruled out a successful attempt by the German
authorities to exploit the country’s dominant position before WWII, at least in European
markets. By analyzing confidential trade data, he showed that Germany’s ability to shape
trade flows to its favor was minimal before the start of the conflict, but then reached massive
size with military occupation.
Ellis (1940), instead, argued that, as the decade progressed and the National Socialist
government’s Aktive Konjunkturpolitik (active business cycle policy) gained importance, ex-
change controls became an essential tool for guaranteeing the coexistence of expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies with a fixed exchange rate, while avoiding capital flight. In
other words, they became an effective tool of the financial repression aimed at channel-
ing resources to government financing, as well as one of the many facets of the NSDAP’s
totalitarian control of trade, investment and the economy in general.
While we believe the evidence points in favor of Ellis’ interpretation, explaining the
introduction and persistence of the exchange control system is not the purpose of this paper,
and the topic has received a lot of attention in the past. We focus on documenting and
explaining an offshoot of the exchange control system: the debt repatriations. In doing this,
we believe we also shed some additional light on the motivation for the introduction and
persistence of the exchange control system, part of which - we argue - was avoiding excessive
external debt repayment.
Heuser (1934), along with many contemporaries, saw the debt repatriations as a way to
subsidize German exports. This interpretation was supported by the fact that the German
government, in the rare cases in which it acknowledged the existence of the practice, justified
the repatriations as such.26 Due to the devaluation of the Pound, the Dollar and other
currencies following the departure of the respective countries from the Gold Standard, many
German exports ceased to be competitive on world markets. If a company could demonstrate
that its production costs exceeded world prices, the Reichsbank could grant it the possibility
of repurchasing German bonds (similar operations were carried out with blocked accounts
of foreigners in Germany) on foreign markets with part of the export proceeds, to then sell
them in Germany for much higher prices.27 The system represented a way to depreciate the
26For example, in this memorandum prepared in English by the German Government: FOLIO FHG/3: The
Repurchase of German Foreign Bonds, Berlin January 26 1934, London School of Economics and Political
Science Archive.
27On average, only 50% of the export proceeds were used to repurchase bonds (at least officially), while
the rest was compulsorily handed over to the Reichsbank. A detailed description of the mechanism can
be found in Heuser (1934), page 212-214. These exports were “additional” (in German Zusatzausfuhr), in
the sense that they would not have been possible without this disguised subsidy. In its attempt to appease
creditors worried about the practice, the German government declared that, due to their additional nature,
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Reichsmark on export markets, while avoiding depreciation in the nominal exchange rate.
Heuser (1934) and Child (1958) attributed Germany’s reliance on overt and disguised
export subsidies to the inapplicability of policies normally employed to stimulate exports
and reduce imports. Devaluation was ruled out, at least initially, due to the large size of the
foreign currency denominated debt, which would have increased dramatically in real value.
Moreover, forfeiting the gold anchor might have led to an increase in the import prices of
essential raw materials and to general inflationary pressures bearing unpleasant memories of
the hyperinflation of less than a decade earlier (Ellis, 1940). The alternative to devaluation
and export subsidies was represented by additional deflationary policies. Imposing these
on an already depressed economy, however, might have caused violent social unrest and
additional capital flight.
The additional export system was, according to Heuser, one of the few options left to
Germany to increase exports and thus maintain the foreign debt service. More prosaically,
Einzig (1934) wrote that Germany had found a way of “eating [its] cake and keeping it”.
Ellis (1940) concurred with this interpretation, but restricted its validity to a limited time
frame, arguing that, after 1933, the perpetuation of exchange controls ceased to have an
economic rationale and was, instead, based on political objectives of the National Socialist
regime.
A number of authors have shed doubts on the interpretation of the debt repatriations as
an export subsidy. Firstly, Ellis (1941), Balogh (1938) and Child (1958) concurred on the fact
that exchange controls and debt repurchases gained some importance in trade policy only in
the middle of 1932, while the debt repatriations started already in 1931. Ellis also expressed
doubts as to whether the repurchase of bonds and blocked accounts could be directly linked
to additional exports. Moreover, Klug (1993) showed that the Reichswirtschaftsministerium
did not consider the price differential between New York and Berlin to be high enough for
the additional export practice to be beneficial, given the foreign exchange shortage faced by
Germany.28
7.2 Klug’s reassessment: debt repatriations as a tool to reduce
foreign debt overhang
In the most recent reassessment of the German repatriations, Klug (1993) argued that they
were a tool to reduce Germany’s foreign debt overhang. This interpretation has its roots
in the theoretical literature, which originated from the 1980s Latin American debt crisis,
they represented a source of foreign exchange, rather than a leakage, and as such they would help Germany
meet its debt service.
28Klug also claimed that the fact that German exports expanded most between 1934 and 1936, when debt
repatriations were low, is a sign that these were not instrumental in Germany’s foreign economic policy.
This argument does not consider the fact that debt repatriations might have been low exactly because they
were not needed to subsidize exports. Furthermore, the introduction of Schacht’s New Plan in 1934 meant
that Germany started engaging heavily in bilateral trade and clearing agreements. These often comprised
the direct exchange of goods, which increased German exports considerably without the need of explicit or
disguised subsidies.
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when economists discussed the merits of different forms of debt reduction, including market-
based ones such as debt repurchases. Opinions on the practice varied widely, with some
authors considering debt repatriations a useful instrument within the toolkit of developing
countries attempting to lower their debt, and others considering them outright harmful for
both debtors and creditors.29
With regard to Germany, James (1985) argued that debt repatriations contributed to
restore the country’s credibility abroad, a fact demonstrated, according to him, by increases
in the price of German bonds traded abroad. In his study, Klug analyzed a large number
of German bond issues in New York, finding that debt repatriations did indeed raise sec-
ondary market prices, but the effect was not strong. According to the author, this finding
demonstrates that the Bulow and Rogoff (1988, 1991) framework, - which stipulates that
repatriations raise the value of the residual debt, thus offsetting the benefits of the debt over-
hang reduction - does not apply to the German case. He therefore concludes that Germany
might have marginally benefited from the repatriations in terms of overhang reduction.
In support of Klug’s interpretation stands the wider experience of the 1930s debt crisis.
According to Eichengreen and Portes (1990a), page 4 “[...] market-based debt reduction
made a useful contribution to resolving the debt crisis of the 1930s by reducing the debt
overhang and eliminating marginal creditors”. The authors, however, do not mention Ger-
many in their assessment of the role of debt repatriations in the 1930s, even though it carried
out by far the largest of such operations.
We believe that Klug’s interpretation has several limits. While German foreign debt did
indeed fall sharply during the 1930s - commercial debt was more than halved, going from
32.6 billion in 1930 to 13.9 in 1938 - debt repatriations were a small part of this reduction. Of
much greater importance was the departure of the USA and Great Britain - and eventually
all countries - from the Gold Standard, which led to sizable devaluations of German debt
denominated in foreign currency. The Lausanne Conference of 1932, moreover, put an end
to the war reparations, further drastically reducing Germany’s foreign debt burden.
The rapid recovery of the German economy in the second half of the 1930s also meant
that the debt burden became lighter. Germany arguably stopped facing a debt overhang
around 1932-33. However, the debt repatriations reached their peak precisely in 1933 and
well before the government and Reichsbank managed to impose their complete control on the
29Although the systematic study of debt repatriations is relatively recent, their practice has a long history.
While they were almost unknown in the 19th century, they were widespread already in the 1930s (Klug,
1993), as the German episode shows. The main rationale for voluntary, market-based initiatives to reduce
the debt overhang is that they can help overcome the free-rider problem among creditors Froot (1989).
Each creditor has no interest in reducing her claims, especially if the debtor is believed to be on the wrong
side of the debt Laffer curve. The reason is that, in this scenario, debt relief raises the value of expected
repayment and, thus, of residual claims, benefiting remaining creditors. Froot, however, concludes that debt
repatriations are difficult to work in practice, mainly due to the fact that finding the necessary resources is
not trivial and that the exact dynamics behind the debt Laffer curve are difficult to measure. However, debt
repatriations could be used as a signal of the willingness to reform (Bulow and Rogoff, 1991; Fernandez-
Ruiz, 2000). The consensus appears to be that debt repatriations can be beneficial for both debtors and
creditors only when they take place in the context of further concession and the senioritization of existing
debts relative to new ones (Bulow and Rogoff, 1991; Detragiache, 1994).
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practice, which happened only after the transfer moratorium of 1934 (Ellis, 1940). In fact, the
Reichsbank president Hans Luther, expressed disappointment for the failure of the German
authorities to curb debt repurchases more effectively, while the Reichswirtschaftsministerium,
although viewing the practice with more favor, was also eager to keep it under strict control
(James, 1985). Improvements were also recorded on the balance of payments around the
same time (Ellis, 1940). These elements make it difficult to sustain the interpretation of
the repurchases as a tool to reduce the debt overhang: when overhang reduction was most
needed, repatriations were scarcely used as a policy tool, and they continued long after
Germany stopped facing a crushing foreign debt.
The use of debt repatriations to reduce Germany’s foreign debt appears even more un-
likely for a country heading for political and economic isolationism and marching in rapid
steps towards war. Some recorded debt repatriations, principally of Austrian debt, took
place as late as 1944, in the full swing of the war (Klug, 1993) and it is unclear why the
German government would want to reduce the debt overhang of Austria in the midst of the
war.
Finally, Klug himself showed that, if the debt repatriations led to any reduction in the
market value of the debt at all, then this was minimal. A government-coordinated mobiliza-
tion of thousands of individuals and companies, as well as billions of Reichsmarks, to bring
about a minimal reduction in the value of the foreign debt does not appear realistic.30
The principal limit of Klug’s interpretation is that - alongside most of the 1980s literature
- it considers debt repatriations only in the context of a coordinated program by a highly
indebted country trying to reduce its debt overhang. Debt repatriations, however, can also
be a private initiative of citizens and firms of a debtor country who value the debt differently
from creditors abroad. Classens and Diwan (1989) argue that the difference in valuation can
arise in three instances: 1) discount factors differ between creditors and debtors, 2) creditors
receive an amount different from that paid by the debtors, 3) the perceived probability of
default is different for citizens of the debtor and creditor countries. As we have argued
above, it was indeed different default probabilities, concrete rather than perceived, between
domestic and foreign bondholders that led to the German repatriations.
8 Conclusion
We have studied a relatively little-explored aspect of German economic history in the inter-
war period: the large repurchases of foreign debt carried out by Germans between 1931 and
30Klug further claimed that the National Socialist government was particularly attached to the practice of
foreign debt repatriations, even though these began well before it rose to power. Barkai (1990), however,
argues that the NSDAP had no clear economic ideology. Their method consisted in establishing some
goals, and trying to reach them through trial and error and by leaving the technicalities to experts and
bureaucrats, often outside the Nazi party, such as those of the Wirtschaftsministerium and the Reichsbank.
James (1985) further argued that Reicshbank presidents Luther and Schacht used the pivotal role of the
bank in foreign and economic policy to realise “their economic vision”. These elements hardly suggest a
harmonious and coherent economic policy in Germany in the first half of the 1930s.
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1939. This paper critically assesses the considerations of contemporaries who observed and
studied the episode31 together with more recent studies by historians and economists32. We
have argued that debt repatriations were not suppressed altogether once authorities stepped
in during the Summer of 1931, because they allowed the pursuit of specific micro-objectives.
Key industries, companies and influential individuals benefited from the repurchases in sev-
eral ways. Debt repatriations were used as a hidden subsidy to promote exports, as a tool
to reduce private debt exposure and as a way to make large arbitrage profits. At the same
time, their use as a systematic macro-tool was ruled out by the fact that it would have led
to excessive debt repayment and welfare losses for the German economy as a whole.
A theoretical framework which explicitly considers the role of secondary markets for
sovereign debt applies extremely well to the German episode. We based our interpretation on
the seminal work of Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2008, 2010) and extensions thereof which
account for heterogeneous debtors, whose welfare is valued differently by the government, and
heterogeneous creditors, whose information sets differ regarding the possibility of default. To
our knowledge, this paper is the first detailed historical empirical case-study demonstrating
the importance of secondary markets in foreign debt crises.
Our interpretation is supported by published and unpublished historical documents and
archival sources, as well as quantitative analysis of weekly prices of German bonds in New
York and Berlin. We have identified structural breaks in these series together with asym-
metric confidence intervals which we then associate to key political and economic events.
We find that government interventions and other events which hampered the functioning of
secondary markets and made debt repatriations difficult had sharply negative effects on the
price of bonds on the New York Stock Exchange. We do not find an association with other
episodes that directly affected the servicing of German debt, except for an extreme event
such as the beginning of WWII. The results of the empirical analysis match the predictions
of the Broner, Martin, and Ventura (2008, 2010) model and its extensions.
In sum, this paper contributes to the understanding of the somewhat unclear case of debt
repatriation in Germany in the 1930s. The principal finding is that international secondary
markets prices for German bonds were hardly affected by changes in official policy: instead,
the main drivers of price changes were factors affecting the efficiency of these markets. In line
with these results, we find that buybacks were largely a private initiative exploiting arbitrage
opportunities. Contrary to previous research, we do not find evidence that debt repatriations
were a political attempt to deal with debt overhang. The extent of policy intervention was
limited to attempting export subsidization and granting favors that came piggybacked with
private repatriations initiatives. This paper also adds to the literature investigating the role
of secondary markets on sovereign risk. Recent work by Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura
(2014) shows that this literature can help explain some puzzling features of the current
European debt crisis. We show that the underlying theoretical lenses they use can provide
an useful framework and lead to novel insights also in quite different episodes.
31Prominent examples are Einzig (1934), Heuser (1934), Harris (1935), Balogh (1938), Bonnel (1940) and
Ellis (1941).
32In particular, Child (1958), James (1985) and Klug (1993).
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Bank of England Archive, Germany Country File:
• OV34/69 - Die Auslandsverschuldung Deutschlands nach dem Stande von 30. Novem-
ber 1931
• OV34/148: Special advisory Committee Basel 1931
• OV34/179: Germany Moratorium. Report of the committee appointed to examine and
interpret the figures submitted by the Reichsbank, May 30th 1933
London School of Economics and Political Science Archive:
• FOLIO FHG/3 - The Repurchase of German Foreign Bonds, Berlin January 26 1934,
memorandum prepared in English by the German Government
The Annalist: A Journal of Finance, Commerce and Economics
• Vol. 35-56, January 1930 - October 1940, The New York Times Company
Foreign Exchange Control Laws, 1937-38:
• Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1937, Teil I, Nr. 65, p. 600-601
• Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1937, Teil I, Nr. 105, p. 1018-19
• Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1938, Teil I, Nr. 211, p. 1733-48: Antra¨ge auf
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tung
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A Reconstructed spread series
The Berlin Stock exchange was closed between July 1931 and April 1932. We reconsruct the
missing values under different scenarios, all but one involving an eight-week slump in prices
correlated to the dynamics of the US stock market (Global Financial Data). The scenarios
differ in the timing of the slump (ranging from mid-July to August until October-November
1931), whereas one consists in a linear interpolation for the whole missing subsample. We
then use these reconstructed series for the Berlin mortgage bonds to get four different spreads
series for the Dawes and Young bonds respectively. The graph below shows the eight recon-
structed spread series: with respect to Young and Dawes bonds alike, the series obviously
overlap for the whole sample, except for the reconstructed subsample.
Figure 6: Different reconstructed spreads series of Dawes and Young bonds traded in New York
with respect to mortgage bonds traded in Berlin; weekly frequency. See main text for sources.
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